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Executive Summary 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) is often 
portrayed as a policy that will mitigate climate change whilst fostering social and 
environmental improvements in the most isolated and under-developed regions of the 
world. Our work sets out to assess this claim by evaluating whether REDD is effectively 
designed as an instrument that is suitable for generating local development in forest 
regions. After revealing the underlying governance rationale through which REDD is 
expected to generate positive outcomes on the global and local levels, we develop a 
framework to assess whether the REDD strategies developed through the FCPF and the 
UN-REDD Readiness initiatives are putting in place the policy environment that is 
necessary for REDD to function as a development mechanism. 
Through the comparative analysis of six national Readiness strategies from the Latin 
American region, we reveal that policies designed under Readiness systematically pay 
more attention to the development of baseline emissions scenarios and MRV systems 
than to the establishment of the policy conditions that must be in place for REDD to 
generate local development.  
Our analysis suggests that a number of policy design elements might be resulting in the 
failure of national REDD strategies to address underlying governance problems. The 
phased approach to Readiness creates incentives for governments to rush through the 
institutional reform stages, and REDD’s current design only rewards quantifiable GHG 
emissions reductions, providing few incentives for countries to invest in social and 
environmental improvements. Furthermore, the reliance on carbon market finance and the 
operational structure of the FCPF may also result in overinvestments in MRV systems to 
the detriment of more complex institutional reforms. We conclude by presenting a set of 
recommendations for reforming the underlying governance logic of REDD in order to 
enhance its potential as a local development mechanism.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction and methodology 
1.1 Introduction to topic 
Forestry has become one of the most controversial topics in international climate 
negotiations. Questions of whether and how to incorporate forest sector greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions into a post-Kyoto climate regime have been at the centre of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) debates, and crucial 
problems remain unresolved. Controversies surrounding the introduction of forest carbon 
into the climate regime result from the technical complexities that are intrinsic to this 
sector - those same complexities that prevented forest conservation from being included 
in the Clean Development Mechanism (COP/UNFCCC, 2001). Uncertainties regarding 
the measurement of forest carbon stocks, the establishment of baseline emission levels, 
the prevention of leakage and the development monitoring systems remain problems with 
no simple solution.  
Such controversies become even more complex due to the multi-layered structure under 
which climate change is governed. Policy decisions are made at many levels by various 
actors operating in diffuse networks, and any given policy proposal is constantly 
circulated amongst multiple spheres of governance (Newell and Bulkeley, 2010, p. 54). 
In this context, questions of agency and accountability become important. How are 
different actors interacting to shape decision making? And will the resulting policy 
achieve the stated goals of the international climate regime, which encompass not only 
climate change mitigation but also the promotion of local development and the 
enhancement of environmental quality? These are the underlying questions that will 
guide the present study. 
The idea of including reduced deforestation into a global GHG mitigation strategy was 
first presented in the 11th Conference of Parts to the UNFCCC. There, the governments of 
Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica submitted a joint proposal supporting the inclusion of 
strategies to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation (RED) into the global climate regime 
(Governments of Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea 2001). Their argument was that 
2forest sector emissions are significant drivers of climate change, and that in the absence 
of global efforts to halt forest destruction in developing countries, forest sector emissions 
would continue to rise. The argument was that deforestation occurs primarily because 
trees are worth nothing while standing up, making forests more of an obstacle to 
economic development than an asset and creating incentives for deforestation. If 
international cooperation could shift the economic balance behind land use change by 
attributing monetary value to forest carbon, incentives to preserve forests would be 
created and forest conversion would be reduced.   
After 2005, discussions on forestry and climate change took off at an impressive speed. 
In 2007, the Bali Action Plan put forth the concept of Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation, sustainable forest management, and enhancement 
of forest carbon stocks (REDD+).1 Parties to the UNFCCC were thereby encouraged to 
“explore a range of actions, identify options and undertake efforts to address the drivers 
of deforestation relevant to their national circumstances.” (COP 13/UNFCCC, 2003).   
But the discourse legitimizing REDD does not confine itself to the goal of reducing GHG 
emissions. Much like the CDM, REDD is framed as a strategy to promote the sustainable 
development of non-Annex II countries. By channelling investments to some of the 
poorest, most isolated regions of the world, a global forest carbon programme is expected 
to generate livelihood improvements for poverty-stricken and forest-reliant populations, 
to gift them with income and to foster sustainable forms of land use.   
As laudable as this might be, there are many reasons to question the effectiveness of 
REDD as a development mechanism. Such a scheme will affect many of the poorest 
regions of the world, places where governance is fragile and institutions such as property 
rights and law enforcement are typically weak and problematic (Brown, Seymour and 
Peskett, 2009). Many international programmes have previously tried and failed to 
improve forest governance and better the livelihood of forest dwellers by injecting 
investments into forest management (Corbera, Brown and Adger 2007; Angelsen 2009). 
																																																								
1 The “+” in “REDD+” refers to the additional activities of sustainable forest management and carbon stock 
enhancement currently contemplated in the forestry debates at the UNFCCC. For the sake of simplicity, we 
will use the acronym REDD throughout this study. 
3They failed because they did not take into account the underlying drivers of deforestation 
and the problematic institutional infrastructure available for governing such areas. 
Furthermore, there are stakeholders interested turning REDD into nothing more than a 
cost-effective mechanism to generate carbon offsets for compliance and voluntary 
markets, ignoring the social and environmental risks involved in such a project. And 
these risks are high. Without the improvement of underlying structures such as land 
tenure security and law enforcement, the valuation of forests may be extremely 
prejudicial to the livelihoods of local communities. Examples of forest carbon deals 
leading to human rights abuses, dispossession and concentration of land ownership are 
growing by the day, and any development-oriented REDD programme will have to work 
hard to avoid these pitfalls (Carbon Trade Watch, 2010; Peskett et al., 2008). 
From previous failed efforts to preserve forests, policy makers have recognized the 
importance of addressing underlying governance issues behind deforestation. And while 
no agreement is reached on what REDD will become in the post-Kyoto regime, 
multilateral development organizations and national governments have taken it upon 
themselves to improve the institutional structure of countries interested in taking part in 
future REDD activities through the so-called REDD-Readiness initiatives. These 
initiatives have the objective of preparing developing countries to receive REDD in the 
future by providing them with financial and technical support. 
The question of whether REDD will be effective in fostering local development and 
improving the livelihood of local communities largely depends on the design of 
Readiness initiatives, which may or may not build the necessary policy environment for 
REDD to achieve its development goals. Currently, two large Readiness strategies are 
being implemented: the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and the 
United Nations REDD Programme (UN-REDD). Our work will focus on the design and 
outputs of these initiatives. 
 
1.2 Research question and methods 
In this context, our work sets out to answer the following question: Are the national 
REDD strategies being constructed in Latin America under the UN-REDD Programme 
4and the FCPF putting in place a model of REDD that is oriented toward improving the 
livelihood of forest reliant communities and fostering sustainable land use?  
The goal is to assess national Readiness strategies according to their suitability for 
attaining the stated development objectives of REDD. It can be inferred from this that we 
do not intend to measure the direct impacts of these programmes on local development, 
namely because most of the policy reforms that are to take place under Readiness have 
not yet been implemented. At this stage, it is important to examine the policy strategies 
that are being built under Readiness and assess if these initiatives are fostering 
development-oriented policy reforms. Thus far, many Latin American countries have 
developed national REDD strategies and submitted them to the FCPF and the UN-REDD 
in order to obtain funding for implementation. It is therefore possible to evaluate and 
thereby reveal certain patterns in the Readiness programs.   
In order to answer this question, we will follow a four-step process: After presenting the 
role of Readiness and the development objectives of REDD, we will reveal the in-built 
governance rationale through which REDD is expected to generate local development 
and identify a set of prerequisites that must be in place in order for the logic to operate 
effectively – we call these the preconditions for effectiveness.  
We will then develop an analytical framework for assessing whether REDD strategies are 
putting in place the underlying conditions for effectiveness and preparing structures to 
promote poverty alleviation and sustainable land use through carbon finance. Finally, we 
will apply the framework to six Latin American countries in order to assess whether the 
policy environment being built under Readiness fulfils the conditions for effectiveness of 
a development-oriented REDD.  This will allow us to, on the one hand, assess individual 
country strategies, and, on the other, evaluate the Readiness initiatives on an aggregate 
level and map out which policy outcomes and reforms are being favoured by these 
programs. 
 
1.3 Relevance of Work 
The present study is based on the assumption that despite the “triple-win” discourse that 
legitimizes REDD as being good for the environment, good for the climate and good for 
5the people, promoting local development through carbon valuation in areas of limited 
governance is complex task. The risk of REDD resulting in a loss of welfare for local 
communities, land grabbing, and human rights violations is extremely high (Kanowski, 
McDermott Cashore 2011; Carbon Trade Watch 2010). These risks mean not only that 
the instrument may fail to promote sustainable and equitable development, but also that 
efforts to reduce forest sector GHG emissions may be unsuccessful. If local stewards of 
forests do not feel they are benefiting from REDD, the legitimacy of the programme is 
reduced, and incentives to drop out increase (Corbera, Brown and Adger 2007). If they 
feel threatened, sectors of civil society will do what is possible to block REDD 
negotiations – a trend that has been increasing since COP-15. 
Therefore, the local impacts of REDD must be taken seriously. Failing to do so might 
imply not only the fiasco of one more promising strategy to tackle climate change, but 
also the loss of livelihood of highly vulnerable and historically disadvantaged populations 
– a matter of both political and ethical importance. Both outcomes can be better avoided 
through careful policy design and evaluation. 
In this context, our works seeks to add two dimensions to the current – and abundant – 
literature on REDD. First, and differently from most of the existing literature, we argue 
that REDD design is already – and despite the fundamental indecision at the UNFCCC - 
being consolidated. There is a vast body of literature on the potential policy designs of 
REDD, but this literature focuses on listing and explaining different policy options 
(Angelsen, 2008; Angelsen, 2009; Karsenty 2008; Meridian Institute, 2009). We argue 
that while listing and understanding possibilities is an important exercise, there is already 
a REDD strategy being constructed, and this strategy deserves more attention and 
scrutiny. The possibilities for REDD design have already been narrowed, mainly due to 
the action of transnational governance networks under the leadership of the FCPF and 
UN-REDD. Although these networks have no official hierarchical power, through their 
work with Readiness they are forwarding a very specific design for REDD, rooted in 
carbon market finance and in payments for carbon mitigation outputs.   
Second, we seek to provide a sound analytical framework to assess an argument that has 
been made by several CSOs: despite the lip service they pay to promoting local 
6development and livelihood improvement, Readiness initiatives have a very narrow focus 
on building infrastructure for carbon accounting in developing countries (Dooley, et al. 
2011; Dooley, Griffiths and Ozinga 2009). This narrow perspective is said to divert 
investments away from the underlying institutional reforms and improvements that are 
necessary for REDD to operate as a development mechanism. We therefore provide a 
framework with objective criteria to assess if this claim is true, and also to suggest ways 
of remedying Readiness. 
 
1.4 Structure of work 
Our study will be divided in six chapters. Chapter two will briefly present the role of 
Readiness initiatives in REDD governance and analyse how the stated development goals 
of REDD are framed by the UNFCCC and the Readiness operational frameworks.   
Chapter three will reveal the in-built governance rationales of REDD, assessing how a 
global strategy to mitigate forest GHG emissions is expected, in theory, to foster the local 
development forest regions. Next, we will establish a set of prerequisites or conditions 
that must be in place for REDD+ to operate in practice as as it is expected to in theory. 
Chapter four will present the analytical framework we developed to assess the degree of 
development-orientation of national REDD strategies constructed under Readiness, and 
in chapter five will apply this framework to six Latin American Countries and scrutinize 
which kinds of policy reforms are being put in place under Readiness, finally revealing if 
the FCPF and UN-REDD are operating as development-oriented initiatives.  
Finally, chapter six will present our conclusions policy recommendation for enhancing 
the local development potential of REDD+. 
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Global goods, local development: REDD and positive synergies in the discourse 
of the UNFCCC and Readiness 
  
Among the various policy actors and policy arenas involved in the governance of REDD, 
our study focuses on understanding the role and impacts of two organizations that have 
assumed leading positions in the process of designing and implementing forest carbon 
mitigation strategies: the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and the 
United Nations Collaborative Program on Reducing Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (UN-REDD).2 These organizations have taken the lead in helping countries 
prepare to integrate a future system for mitigating forest carbon emissions. This 
preparation process, which includes policy reform, infrastructure investments capacity 
building and institutional reform, is referred to as Readiness. 
The present chapter will describe the role played by these organizations and by the 
Readiness initiatives in the governance of REDD (section 2.1) and will analyse how local 
development outcomes – which encompass environmental and social dimensions – are 
framed in their discourse and operational framework (section 2.2).   
2.1 The role of Readiness: preparing the ground 
Readiness initiatives can be better understood in the context of recent COP/UNFCCC 
decisions. The most important political accords regarding the design and implementation 
of a forest carbon mitigation strategy were negotiated in three Conferences of Parties: 
COP-13 in Bali, COP-16 in Cancun and COP-17 in Durban. The Bali Roadmap 
(COP/UNFCCC, 2003b) was the first decision to recognize REDD as a potential 
emissions mitigation strategy and to encourage country Parties to invest in REDD 
demonstration activities. The Roadmap was a catalyst for REDD, urging developed 
nations to pool together resources for forest conservation and emphasizing the need for 
long-term finance targeted at building institutional and infrastructural capacity in 
																																																								
2 For more detailed and thorough accounts of the institutions involved in climate change governance, see: 
Giddens, 2011; Newell und Bulkeley, 2010; and Faure, Gupta und Nentjes, 2003. 
8developing countries. Initial investments in infrastructure, institution and capacity 
building were expected to be large and would entail high risks; furthermore, the public 
good nature of such investments precluded large-scale finance from the private sector 
(Dutschke and Wertz-Kanounikoff, 2008; Ardot, 2010). Given the unwillingness or 
incapacity of developing country governments to finance these investments, the costs 
were covered by international grant finance operating through the so-called REDD-
Readiness initiatives.  
The World Bank launched the FCPF in 2008, shortly after COP/13. Its goals were to 
support countries in the development and implementation of REDD and to catalyse 
private investments in forest carbon mitigation. Also in 2008, the United Nations 
launched the UN-REDD Program as a platform for collaboration among the United 
Nations Development Program (UNPD), the United Nations Environment Program 
(UNEP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). These organizations are to 
provide financial support and technical assistance to developing countries as they design 
and implement their national REDD strategies.  
Experiences from the FCPF and UN-REDD are shaping international understanding 
about what REDD will look like and how it is to be implemented. Today these programs 
provide finance and technical support to nearly all countries developing REDD 
strategies.3 Investments from Readiness go basically into two areas: (i) technical support 
for the development of GHG emissions baselines and of monitoring, reporting and 
verification systems for forest carbon stocks (MRVs); and (ii) institutional reforms that 
seek to improve the policy environment in forest regions. In theory, this includes 
improvements in land tenure, the design of participative decision making processes, the 
strengthening of law enforcement and conflict resolution mechanisms in forest regions, 
etc.  
The FCPF currently works with 37 developing countries, and more than US$ 230 million 
have been committed to the Facility by country governments and CSOs (Forest Carbon 
																																																								
3 Brazil is the most notable exception to the global outreach of these Readiness initiatives, since it receives 
bilateral Readiness funding from the governments of Norway and Germany and manages REDD finance 
the nationally administered Amazon Fund. 
9Partnership Facility, 2012). 4  Operating under the World Bank Carbon Finance 
Department, the FCPF consists of two separate mechanisms: the Readiness Mechanisms, 
which assists countries in preparing of a REDD strategy, establishing a national reference 
scenario and a carbon monitoring, reporting and verification system (MRVs); and a 
Carbon Finance Mechanism, through which the FCPF will pilot incentive payments for 
REDD in developing countries (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, 2008). To integrate 
the Readiness mechanism, countries must first submit a Readiness Plan Idea Note – R-
PIN. If approved, the Readiness Fund will grant up to US$ 200,000 for the country to 
prepare a Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP) where the roadmap for readiness is laid 
out, followed by a grant of up to US$ 3,4 million to support implementation of the R-PP. 
After the R-Package is delivered, countries are considered Ready and may participate in 
Emission Reductions Payments Agreements (ERPAs) under the Carbon Fund. It should 
be noted that, while Readiness Fund contributions are grants, the Carbon Fund investors 
are expecting a return on their investments –namely in the form of carbon credits (Forest 
Carbon Partnership Facility, 2008; Dooley et al. 2011). 
Moreover, approximately US$ 120 million have been committed to the UN-REDD 
Program to date (UN-REDD, 2012). UN-REDD currently works with 29 partner 
countries. To receive funding, counties must submit National Program Documents 
(NPDs), which include an overview of the country’s situation with regard to forest laws 
and management and identifies major targets to be achieved through Readiness. To date, 
the National Programmes of 13 Pilot Partner Countries have been approved, with 10 
countries currently in the implementation phase.    
As these organizations provide the finance for REDD, they also engage in important 
governance activities such as soft rule and standard setting, benchmarking and 
information sharing. They function as hubs in policy networks that bring together the 
various stakeholders of REDD. Through the soft authority provided by their financing 
power and their centrality in policy networks, the WB and UN-REDD have become key 
players in REDD design and implementation.  
																																																								
4 Contributors to the FCPF include governments of Australia, Finland, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States of America. The European Commission 
and The Nature Conservancy are also financial contributors (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, 2012). 
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The importance of these programs is evident. By determining how governments write out 
their Readiness strategies, setting benchmarks and best practices (Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility, 2010; UN-REDD Programme, 2011), providing technical assistance 
and finance, these initiatives use several modalities of soft power to influence policy 
outcomes. And due to the nature of readiness – which encompasses deep and long-term 
policy reform – the consequences of these initiatives are likely to be long-lived. This is 
why it is so important to study and scrutinize them. 
   
2.2 Promises, promises: Local development in the REDD discourse 
Promises of local development are stamped all over the REDD discourse. They are to be 
found in the global climate debates, in the pictures and pamphlets of the FCPF and UN-
REDD, and in the demands of civil society organizations. Behind these promises lies the 
implicit assumption that REDD has the potential to improve the livelihood of local 
communities whilst reducing GHG emissions and mitigating climate change. But the 
backdrop against which REDD gains its normative dimensions of development 
promotion is more complex: as the forest conservation strategy, REDD must differentiate 
itself from previous conservationist efforts that have brought much harm to forest reliant 
communities. In the past, conservationist forest management has been conducted to the 
detriment of local communities, which were politically marginalized and many times 
forced to leave their lands or deprived of autonomy over land use (Schelhas and Pfeffer 
2008). Why would REDD be any different? 
Ever since the idea of RED emerged in 2005, strategies to mitigate forest-sector GHG 
emissions have been increasingly framed as local development mechanisms. This is, on 
the one hand, associated to the normative framework of the UNFCCC, which is rooted 
upon the principles of equity and sustainable development (UNFCCC, 1992, Article 3.1). 
The Convention states that efforts to tackle climate change should “be appropriate for the 
specific conditions of each Party and should be integrated with national development 
programs, taking into account that economic development is essential for adopting 
measures to address climate change” (UNFCCC, 1992, S. Article 3.4). 
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Furthermore, the development goals of REDD also have to do with the regions in which 
such programs will be implemented. According to the World Bank, forest resources 
directly support the livelihoods of 90% of the 1.2 billion people living in extreme poverty 
(World Bank, 1994).  Local communities depend on forests as a source of fuel, food, 
medicines and shelter and the loss of forests jeopardizes poverty alleviation. In this sense, 
an international strategy that channels resources to poverty-stricken and politically 
marginalized communities has the potential to generate unprecedented social benefits, 
and these synergies have been present throughout REDD discussions. 
Due to all these factors, local development goals have been incorporated into UNFCCC 
decisions on REDD and into the operational framework of Readiness initiatives. Such 
outcomes can be classified in two broad categories: poverty alleviation and sustainable 
land use promotion. The goal of poverty alleviation is straightforward: local and poverty-
stricken populations should receive and benefit from REDD finance. The goal of 
sustainable land use implies that REDD should improve the multiple dimensions of local 
environmental quality, including biological diversity, water and soil quality and 
ecosystem services. 
The table below presents the framing of such development objectives in the Cancun and 
Durban Agreements (COP/UNFCCC, 2010; COP/UNFCCC 2011): 
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Table 2.1: Local development in COP/UNFCCC decisions 
 
 
The local development outcomes presented above are to be ensured through a system of 
environmental and social safeguards that should be “promoted and supported” 
(COP/UNFCCC, 2010). These safeguards include the respect for knowledge and rights of 
indigenous peoples and members of local communities, the full and effective 
participation of relevant stakeholders, in particular indigenous peoples and local 
communities, and the promotion of synergies between local and global environmental 
benefits of REDD. In Durban, the COP agreed that developing country parties should 
provide a summary of information on how all of the safeguards are being addressed and 
respected throughout the implementation of Readiness activities.  
These same promises of local development are also present in the discourse of the 
Readiness initiatives. In its official brochure, the WB-FCPF makes reiterating references 
to providing “fresh sources of finance (…) to the more than 1.2 billion people who 
depend to varying degrees on forests” (FCPF, 2008, p. 6). In the same document, it is 
stated that: 
Local 
development 
dimension 
COP decision/ 
document Full text 
Poverty 
alleviation 
Decision 1 CP/16, 
Annex I , §1 
National strategies to tackle REDD should be implemented in the 
context of sustainable development and reducing poverty while 
responding to climate change. 
Sustainable 
land use 
Decision 1 CP/16 
Annex I , §1 
REDD activities should “be consistent with the objective of 
environmental integrity and take into account the multiple functions 
of forests and other ecosystems;” 
Decision 1 CP/16 
Annex I , §1 
REDD is to promote sustainable management of forests. 
Decision 2, CP 17 The construction of forest reference levels and forest emission 
reference levels needs to be flexible so as to accommodate national 
circumstances and capabilities, while pursuing environmental 
integrity and avoiding perverse incentives. 
Decision 1 CP/16 
Annex I , §2 
REDD actions are to be consistent with the conservation of natural 
forests and biological diversity, ensuring that actions are not used for 
the conversion of natural forests, but are instead used to incentivize 
the protection and conservation of natural forests and their ecosystem 
services, and to enhance other social and environmental benefits. 
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“Given the historical role of indigenous peoples and other forest dwellers as 
stewards of tropical forests, it is critical that governments set up participatory 
instruments to ensure that they be meaningfully consulted during the formulation 
and implementation of the country’s Readiness Plan and REDD Strategy and that 
they benefit from capacity building and financial incentives (FCPF, 2008, p. 12)”.  
According to the FCPF, preserving forests through REDD is a form of reducing 
environmental and social problems associated to deforestation (Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility, 2008, p. 2) and promoting sustainable development (Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility, 2008, p. 4). Official documents describing the aim of the UN-REDD program 
share these same objectives. According to one document, REDD has the following 
purpose: 
“(…) tipping the economic balance in favour of sustainable management of forests 
so that their formidable economic, environmental and services benefit countries, 
communities, biodiversity and forest users while also contributing to important 
contributions in greenhouse gas reductions. (UN-REDD, 2010)” 
The benefits associated to REDD implementation are therefore threefold. First and 
foremost, REDD is a climate change mitigation strategy and should promote the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, forest carbon mitigation strategies 
are expected to spark synergies between global and local benefits and also lead to 
improved livelihood of forest dwelling communities through the channelling of REDD 
finance to poverty-stricken population and to the promotion of sustainable forms of land 
use which enhance local environmental services. This tripartite structure of desired 
outcomes is represented in the figure below: 
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Figure 2.1: Multiple beneficial outcomes of REDD 
 
Source: Own compilation 
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Chapter Three  
 REDD Underlying governance logic and conditions for effectiveness 
 
The previous chapter presented what the development goals of REDD are. Now, we will 
integrate these development goals into REDD’s broader design to answer the question of 
how REDD is expected to achieve these goals. Through which channels is a global 
program for forest carbon mitigation expected to result in poverty alleviation as well as to 
foster socially, economically and environmentally sustainable forms of land use?  
We will do this by presenting the core elements of REDD policy design comprised in 
UNFCCC decisions and Readiness initiatives and by revealing how these are, in theory, 
expected to generate local livelihood improvements (3.1). We will then identify the 
conditions that have to be in place for REDD to work in practice as it is expected to work 
in theory (3.2). As we will see, building a policy environment that enables REDD to 
function as a development mechanism is more complex than simply setting up conditions 
for the operation of carbon markets. Investments are required to improve governance 
structures and specific regulation must be in place to ensure REDD finance benefits 
poverty-stricken communities and fosters sustainable land use. 
 
3.1 Governance rationale: how is REDD expected to promote development?  
The governance rationale behind REDD will be construed through the analysis of 
COP/UNFCCC decisions and Readiness initiatives. 5  Due to the complexity of the 
UNFCCC debates on forestry, we will not be able to present a full account of the 
international negotiations. The main elements of REDD policy design are summarized in 
table 3.1 and more information on them can be found in abundant literature on REDD 
																																																								
5	We chose this approach because, while the COP/UNFCCC is still the official decision making body of the 
international climate regime, we have seen that the WB-FCPF and the UN-REDD Program exert 
substantial influence on REDD design through their authority and the reach of Readiness. Our argument is 
that while core design features of REDD are decided in the multilateral forum of the UNFCCC, the WB 
and UN-REDD are forwarding their own conceptions of REDD in those policy fields where the COP has 
been unable to reach a consensus – namely the finance structure that is to support REDD once a future 
forest carbon mitigation system is in place. 
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(Angelsen, 2008; Angelsen, 2009; Karsenty 2008). In the following, we will focus on 
uncovering the in-built governance logic through which REDD is expected to generate 
local development outcomes. 
 
Table 3.1 – REDD policy design in the COP/UNFCCC decisions 
 
Source: Own compilation 
 
Policy 
element 
  
COP/UNFCCC 
approach 
Details Relevant decisions 
Policy 
alternatives 
Scope of 
program REDD+ 
Mitigation actions in the forest 
sector include reducing emissions 
from deforestation and forest 
degradation, conservation and 
sustainable management of forest 
carbon stocks and enhancement 
of forest carbon stocks 
Decision 
1/CP16, 
paragraph 70 
Japan, Russia and 
the United States 
argue that 
afforestation and 
reforestation 
should also be 
included in 
REDD. 
Governance 
logic 
System of 
positive financial 
incentives 
Developing countries are 
rewarded or compensated for 
emissions reductions. There is no 
mandatory mitigation target or 
obligation to participate. 
Decision 
1/CP16, 
Command and 
control 
instruments; Caps 
on emissions 
Activities 
rewarded 
under 
REDD+ 
Output-based 
system 
Countries are rewarded for 
quantified emissions reductions.  
Decision 
1/CP16, 
Appendix 1 
Input-based 
approach 
Implementat
ion 
Phased approach 
to REDD+ 
 
Phase 1: development of national 
strategies, policies and measures 
and capacity-building; Phase 2: 
Implementation of policies, 
measures and strategies; Phase 3: 
Payments for measured, reported 
and verified results 
Decision 
1/CP16, 
paragraph 73 
 
Scale of 
program National 
Progression towards national 
baselines and national monitoring 
systems; payments at national 
level. 
Decision 
1/CP16 
Incentive 
payments made to 
subnational actors 
Financing 
Dual approach: 
market and non-
market finance 
Diverse financing schemes are 
discussed: ODA, public funds, 
private investments, market for 
offsets, etc. 
Dec. 2/CP.15, 
paragraph 7 
A purely funds-
based approach is 
defended by 
Brazil and 
Bolivia. 
Role of 
developing 
countries 
Institutional and 
technical 
preparation for 
REDD 
Developing country parties 
should develop: (i) a national 
action plan; (ii) a national forest 
reference emission level; (iii) 
robust and transparent national 
forest monitoring and reporting 
systems for emission reductions; 
(iv) a safeguard reporting system. 
 
Decision 
1/CP.16 
Paragraph 71 
 
!
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Table 3.1 presents the most important elements of REDD’s policy design and allows us 
to understand the governance rational of this program. Firstly, REDD is intended as a 
system of positive financial incentives, since the essence of the program is to reward 
developing countries for reducing forest-sector GHG emissions (Karsenty and Ongolo, 
2011). Countries are not obliged to participate in programs to reduce forest sector GHG 
emissions, as there will be no mandatory cap on such emissions under REDD.   
Secondly, REDD is designed as a results-based system, as payments are made for 
quantifiable GHG emissions reductions. This approach implies that developing countries 
are not rewarded for their efforts in combating deforestation but rather for the output of 
these efforts, for their performance. Moreover, the narrow scope of the intended system 
entails that local outcomes such as poverty alleviation, improved social and physical 
infrastructure in rural areas and environmental quality improvement are not rewarded.6 
The results-based payments are to be made at the national level. National governments 
are to monitor and certify emissions reductions, and these will be paid for through 
international REDD finance. 
Adding together a governance rationale based on positive incentives with a performance-
based payment system results in a policy design that largely resembles Payment for 
Environmental Service (PES) schemes. In the environmental economics literature, PES 
has been defined as “a voluntary transaction, where a defined environmental service is 
paid for under the condition that the seller continues to provide the service” (Wunder 
2005; Börner et al. 2010, p. 2). These schemes are considered to be superior to traditional 
command and control instruments because their voluntary nature prevents service 
providers from bearing the often substantial opportunity costs of conservation vis-à-vis 
locally more profitable land-use options (Börner et al. 2010, 2). In the case of REDD, the 
																																																								
6	The	performance‐based	characteristic	of	REDD	is	what	distinguished	it	from	previous	input‐based	
investments	 in	 forest	 management.	 Karsenty and Ongolo describe the difference between REDD and 
traditional ODA in the following manner: “As payments are supposed to be based on “performance” (in 
reducing deforestation), it leaves the choice of the means to be used in the hands of the recipient 
governments. REDD payments are only conditioned by the verified reduction of deforestation and 
degradation achieved against a baseline. In that sense, REDD differs from a generation of public foreign 
aid in which releases were conditioned by the adoption of policy measures and changes in the 
legal/institutional framework, that often was hardly negotiated with governments that could be reluctant to 
accept changes that hit vested interests”. (2011: 2) 
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environmental service being traded is a global one – climate change mitigation.  
Furthermore, it is a layered payment system, since governments certify emissions 
reductions and receive funding and thereafter channel it to local service providers 
(Angelsen and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2008; Wertz-Kanounnikoff and Angelsen, 2009). 
This is as far as COP decisions go in specifying how REDD is to operate. Many 
questions remain unanswered. Amongst them, one is crucial: Who is to pay for the 
emissions reductions? Determining adequate sources of finance for REDD is possibly the 
most controversial topic in current debates (The Munden Project, 2011). Reducing 
deforestation through financial incentives will require massive investments – in the range 
of US$ 17-33 billion per year until 2030 (Stern, 2007), raising the question of where such 
funds would come from.   
The Readiness initiatives provide a controversial answer to the question of REDD finance. 
Since the beginning of the REDD discussions, the WB has consistently positioned itself 
in favour of tapping into the carbon market and financing REDD through the creation and 
trading of forest carbon assets. The Bank’s experience in devising and fast-starting 
carbon markets dates back to well before the Kyoto Protocol came into force, with the 
launching of the Prototype Carbon Fund in 2000 (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, 
2008), and since then the Bank’s position on the need to use markets in the fight against 
climate change has been clear. The WB’s entire approach to climate change mitigation 
has been market-centred, a fact that is attested by the overt intentions of the Carbon 
Finance Unit, which specifically put together a Partnership for Market Readiness to help 
countries integrate the carbon market.7   
According to one official statement of the FCPF: 
“The key to the success of climate change mitigation efforts is the development of 
a global market for GHG Emission Reductions (ERs) (…) Going forward, the 
Bank aims to have greater impact on climate change mitigation and poverty 
																																																								
7 According to the WB website, the Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR) “is a grant-based, capacity 
building trust fund that provides funding and technical assistance for the collective innovation and piloting 
of market-based instruments for greenhouse gas emissions reduction.   For many countries, the first step 
toward implementing a market-based instrument is to build market readiness capacity, such as measuring, 
reporting and verification systems or the creation of a regulatory framework. As such, market preparation is 
also a crucial part of the work of the PMR”. Available on http://wbcarbonfinance.org/; last access April 7th 
2012. 
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alleviation through the use of carbon finance by (expanding carbon finance to 
regions and sectors that do not currently participate. To help achieve these 
objectives, the Bank proposed the creation of two new facilities, namely the 
Carbon Partnership Facility and this FCPF” (emphasis added) (Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility 2008, p. 11-12). 
The FCPF therefore integrates the WB’s long-term perspective on developing market-
based carbon finance mechanisms and is part of a broader plan to catalyse and expand 
markets for forest carbon. REDD is an opportunity for the creation of new carbon assets, 
and this is how it is being promoted by the FCPF. The UN-REDD Program has also made 
continuous use of market-oriented discourse in its official documents. With respect to the 
end-design of REDD, the UN-REDD Program stated that:  
“REDD strategies aim to make forests more valuable standing than they would be 
cut down, by creating a financial value for the carbon stored in trees. Once this 
carbon is assessed and quantified, the final phase of REDD involved developed 
countries paying developing countries carbon offsets for their standing forests” 
(The Munden Project, 2011, p.2).  
By adding together these elements, we reveal a governance rationale that operates 
through a market-based payment for environmental services scheme. National 
governments choose to participate and to implement policies that reduce aggregate 
deforestation and forest degradation, therefore reducing emissions; they monitor and 
certify emissions and sell the corresponding CERs to industries and governments that 
need offsets to comply with emissions reductions targets.  
Emissions reductions can be accomplished in many ways. Governments may simply 
decide to turn all forests into conservation areas and enforce extremely restrictive land 
use patterns, thereby reducing deforestation. They may also support the expansion of 
carbon sinks in the form of planted forests and cash crops. Neither one of these options is 
likely to improve the livelihood of local communities or promote sustainable land use – 
they are more likely to lead to a loss of income due to restrictions over and use, 
dispossession and concentration of land ownership.  
In fact, a complex set of conditions must be in place in order for REDD to achieve its 
stated local development goals whilst resulting in reduced GHG emissions. A specific 
policy environment must be constructed in developing countries so that REDD manages 
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to foster development at the local level. Figure 3.1 presents the outline of REDD’s 
governance rationale, and the following section develops the set of conditions that must 
be in place if this scheme is to function effectively as a development mechanism.  
 
Figure 3.1. Layered PES incentives system under REDD 
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own compilation 
 
 
 
3.2 Conditions for effectiveness 
	
It is one thing to hope that REDD finance will be abundant and, once GHG emissions are 
reduced, payments will be rightfully channelled to local, poverty-stricken communities. 
But, as stated by Drauth, “there is a great disparity between how an instrument functions 
in theory and how it functions in practice”, and effectively translating any non-
hierarchical government logic into practice is a challenging enterprise (Drauth, 2009).  
Based on the literature that assesses local development impacts of PES schemes and the 
research that approaches REDD design from a development perspective (Peskett et al. 
2008; Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; Landell-Mills, 2002; Lyster, 2011; Thompson et 
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al., 2011), this section sets out to establish a set of conditions that must be met for REDD 
and its underlying governance logic to function in practice as assumed in theory – i.e. as 
strategy that will promote local development through market-based financial incentives 
for GHG emissions reduction. We call these conditions for effectiveness. 
 
3.2.1 Conditions for effectiveness I: generating and selling carbon credits 
	
This first subsection establishes the conditions that must be met for REDD and its 
underlying governance logic to function as a financial incentives mechanism. These 
conditions have nothing to do with building a policy environment that will lead to a 
development-oriented REDD; rather, they are exclusively focused on enabling the carbon 
market to operate in the forest sector, which requires sophisticated and reliable systems of 
carbon accounting aimed at carbon credit generation.  
 
Reliable baseline emissions scenarios 
The first condition that must be in place for carbon markets to operate in the forest sector 
is the establishment of reliable baseline emissions scenarios. The emissions baseline 
constitutes the backdrop against which reductions are quantified and credited, without it 
no CERs can be generated. According to Decision 1/C.P.16 (COP/UNFCCC, 2010) 
baseline scenarios should be constructed on the national scale. 
 
Transparent and reliable MRV systems 
After the baseline scenario is specified, sophisticated systems have to be put in place in 
order to monitor, report and verify changes in forest cover and translate these changes 
into quantifiable emissions. Such Monitoring, Reporting and Verification Systems 
(MRVs) are at the heart of carbon credit generation, and for a global market to work, 
these systems need to make emissions reductions comparable and commensurable. 
 
There is a third crucial condition for the generation of financial flows through REDD: the 
existence of a well-functioning carbon market. If no demand for carbon offsets exists in 
the first place, then a market-based REDD system will inevitably fail. Since this is not a 
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condition that can be implemented through Readiness – it depends on much broader 
political negotiations and economic circumstances– it has been excluded from our 
analysis. But it should be kept in mind that creating a market-based emissions reduction 
system at a time in which the future of the carbon market is uncertain is a policy choice 
that entails high risks. 
 
3.2.2 Conditions for effectiveness II: alleviating poverty 
	
The conditions listed above are the basic ones for any developing country to generate 
saleable carbon credits and therefore to obtain REDD finance. But the fulfilment of these 
conditions in no way implies that this finance will lead to poverty alleviation and 
sustainable land use. Quite the contrary. It could be captured by elites or stay in the hands 
of government (Corbera, Brown, & Adger, 2007). It can also be diverted into the pockets 
of many intermediaries who are involved in developing REDD projects – consultancies, 
large NGOs, carbon accounting firms – or result in the displacement and dispossession of 
local communities for the sake of conservation and profits. 
This means another set of conditions must be in place in order for REDD finance to 
translate into income for poverty-stricken communities, and these conditions are not 
“essential” to the functioning of carbon markets. They are incremental to a market 
mechanism and therefore could easily be bypassed.  
 
Land tenure and rights over carbon 
If carbon finance is to increase the income of local poverty stricken communities, these 
communities must have secure rights over land and to the carbon on them. This is a 
crucial problem in many developing countries with forest regions, since in these places 
land tenure is many times insecure or not specified or land ownership is predominantly 
public or concentrated in the hands of few landowners. If property rights are not secured 
and enforced, local populations will be excluded from market transactions – they will not 
be owners of carbon and, therefore, will not be service providers. A policy environment 
suitable for poverty alleviation through REDD is one where communities have 
23
recognized and enforced rights to land and forest carbon, and can choose to sell their 
assets as they wish  (Peskett et al., 2008) 
 
Local communities with ability to assess and engage in transactions 
Even if local communities are ensured property rights over carbon and land, in a market-
based system they are expected to act as rational agents, that is, to have access to and 
understand the terms of contract, analyse the costs and benefits of a proposed carbon 
transaction, and, if desirable, engage in the sale of forest carbon. Therefore, local 
communities must have the ability to assess and engage in transactions as rational 
economic agents. No REDD strategy should be put in place before forest dwellers have a 
good understanding of the legal system they are transacting and before they have the 
factual and legal ability to sign binding contracts. 
 
Development oriented Benefit-sharing mechanisms (BSM) 
Many intermediaries participate in REDD design and implementation, such as 
consultancies, large NGOs, governments and carbon accounting firms (The Munden 
Project, 2011; Hajek, Ventresca, Scriven, & Castro, 2011). This raises the question of 
whether REDD finance will reach the hands of local communities and not be diverted to 
organizations that function as intermediaries in the REDD process. It also raises the 
question of how to guarantee REDD will go to the communities that need it most, and not 
to powerful landowners in rural regions. 
It is therefore crucial to establish development-oriented benefit sharing mechanisms that 
regulate the distribution of REDD finance and specify how local communities will 
benefit from the program. Any development-oriented REDD will need to be rooted in 
regulation that channels REDD income to local forest stewards.  
 
Accountable and transparent mechanisms to channel REDD finance 
We saw above that REDD expects to channel large flows of finance into developing 
countries, and that this finance will pass through the hands of national governments 
before it reaches local service providers. Independent structures should therefore be put 
in place in order to monitor the flows of REDD finance and to tackle corruption in 
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government.  Otherwise, it is likely that REDD payments will misappropriated or 
captured by elite and government interests.  
 
Law enforcement 
In order to verify and ensure stakeholders comply with land use regulation as well as with 
contractual agreements concerning carbon transactions under REDD, effective and 
accessible law enforcement institutions need to be in place. It is especially important that 
local communities and forest dwellers are provided mechanisms to channel their 
grievances, meaning they must be given enhanced access to justice and other instances of 
law enforcement. 
 
Social impacts monitoring systems 
Poverty alleviation through REDD requires that income levels and other livelihood 
impacts of the program be monitored and verified. A monitoring and evaluation system is 
part of achieving any policy goal – or else policy makers do not know the impacts of 
programs, cannot evaluate their effectiveness or improve the accuracy of their 
instruments. If REDD is to be seriously implemented as a development mechanism, 
livelihood impacts – including income variation – must be carefully measured, 
systematized and reported through social impacts monitoring systems. 
 
The figure below represents the aforementioned conditions for effectiveness, as well as 
the risks entailed if these conditions are not fulfilled. 
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Figure 3.2 – Conditions for effectiveness: poverty alleviation 
 
 
 
Source: Own compilation 
 
3.2.3 Conditions for effectiveness III: fostering sustainable land use 
	
The conditions outlined above constitute the prerequisites for REDD to function as a 
poverty alleviation mechanism. But there are also underlying conditions that must be in 
place in order for REDD to promote sustainable forms of land use. This is because the 
focus on carbon storage and GHG emissions reductions can easily have perverse 
consequences for land use patterns, creating incentives, for instance, for the expansion of 
large monoculture plantations which take the place of natural forest landscapes – the so-
called “green deserts”. This would result in the reduction of biodiversity and the 
displacement of local populations. 
 
 
 
Adequate definition of forests 
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In order to avoid such negative outcomes, REDD strategies must rely on a definition of 
“forests” that is adequate for the promotion of environmentally sustainable land-use 
patters. Special attention should be paid to which kinds of afforestation and reforestation 
project are accepted under REDD, and regulation should avoid the expansion of 
monoculture cash crops into forested areas.  
 
Environmental safeguards and monitoring systems 
Finally, in order to guarantee improved land use through REDD, it is essential that 
environmental impacts be systematically reported and verified. Again, this is necessary 
for policy monitoring, evaluation and improvement, and without a proper system 
designed toward this end, it is unlikely that REDD will result in local environmental 
benefits. 
 
The figure below represents the underlying conditions for effectiveness, as well as the 
risks entailed if these conditions are not fulfilled. 
  
Figure 3.3 – Conditions for effectiveness: sustainable land use 
 
 
 
Source: Own compilation 
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The figure below summarizes the set of minimum conditions that must be in place for 
REDD to result in local development and point out how the underlying policy elements 
that must be in place to enable poverty alleviation and sustainable land use through 
REDD are largely synergic.  
 
Figure 3.4 – Conditions for effectiveness: summary and synergies 
 
 
  
 
 Source: Own compilation 
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Chapter 4  
Framework for analysis of national REDD strategies in Latin America 
 
4.1 Framework for empirical analysis 
	
The previous chapter revealed the in-built governance rationale of REDD and established 
a set of conditions that must be in place in order for REDD finance to reach poverty-
stricken communities and promote sustainable land use. We also know that these 
conditions are not currently satisfied in the developing countries preparing themselves for 
REDD, and that is why Readiness initiatives exist in the first place. Such initiatives aim 
to set up the appropriate policy environment in which REDD can achieve its local and 
global objectives. Given this framework, we will now analyse the national REDD 
strategies being developed under the FCPF and UN-REDD in Latin America and assess if 
the conditions for the consolidation of a development-oriented REDD are being put in 
place. After all, is Readiness being constructed in the region as a development 
mechanism or merely as a carbon valuation one? 
The goals of this analysis are twofold. The first objective is to assess individual country 
strategies and determine if such strategies effectively consider implementing the 
conditions for local development during the Readiness phase (section 4.4). We will do so 
by evaluating national REDD Readiness strategies according to the criteria and standards 
specified in the analytical framework described below (section 4.2). The second objective 
is to obtain an aggregate picture of the Readiness proposals being developed under the 
FCPF and UN-REDD (section 5.2). More than evaluating individual country strategies, 
this will allow us to assess the Readiness initiatives themselves. It will reveal which 
outputs are being produced through the Readiness initiatives, and uncover specific policy 
design patterns that are emerging under World Bank and UN-REDD leadership.   
Previous empirical studies on Readiness have concluded that national strategies produced 
under the guidance of the WB-FCPF and UN-REDD systematically ignore the need to 
invest in governance and institutions for local development and favor the development of 
systems for carbon accounting – i.e. systems oriented toward the establishment of 
29
emissions baselines, the measurement of carbon stocks and monitoring of emissions 
variations. According to Dooley et al.,  
“The emphasis on quantifying and monitoring emissions continues to sideline core 
governance issues that will need to be addressed – and monitored – in order for countries 
to be successful in reducing deforestation and forest degradation while ensuring 
adherence to social and environmental safeguards” (Dooley, Griffiths, Martone, & 
Ozinga, 2011, S. 22). 
Our work provides an analytical framework through which this and other similar 
arguments can be scrutinized (Daviet et al., 2009; Goers & Davis, 2011). It also allows to 
test whether the development goals of REDD are being taken seriously in the Readiness 
processes, or if they only serve as legitimizing but false discourse. 
The materials used in this analysis are the official documents produced by country 
governments for the FCPF and UN-REDD in order to receive funding for Readiness 
preparation. Countries that participate in the FCPF were assessed based on their 
Readiness-Preparation Proposals (R-PPs) and countries that are part of UN-REDD were 
evaluated based on their National Program Documents (NPDs). These documents are an 
important step toward becoming “ready” for REDD. Their function is to provide a 
roadmap for readiness and to specify activities and measures that are to be implemented 
in order to achieve Readiness, including a list of necessary policy reforms, a map of 
stakeholders constellations, budgets and timeframes (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, 
December 2010; Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, 2008; UN-REDD Programme, 2011). 
These documents are public and can be assessed in the respective websites of the FCPF 
and the UN-REDD Program.8 
R-PPs and NPDs were evaluated based on whether and to what extent they address the 
ten conditions for implementing a functional and development-oriented REDD described 
in chapter three. In these documents, the conditions for effectiveness should constitute the 
outcomes of Readiness, i.e. as specific elements of a policy environment that should be 
achieved through the Readiness process.   
In designing the analytical framework, our assumption was that it is insufficient to assess 
whether or not R-PPs and NPDs mention these conditions as desired outcomes of 
																																																								
8 Programme Websites: www.un-redd.org and www.forestcarbonpartnership.org. Last access on April 7th 
2012.	
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Readiness, since this is easy to do and does not imply that the condition is being taken 
seriously by governments. Therefore, we added additional criteria for evaluation of 
country documents, which allowed us to assess how entrenched the implementation of 
each condition is in each national REDD strategy.  
In this sense, R-PPs and NPDs were assessed based on whether the conditions for 
effectiveness were addressed on three different levels: 
1) Does the R-PP or NPD recognize the need to implement the condition or attest to 
it already being in place? This is the most superficial and simple criterion, which 
refers to whether the condition is mentioned as an outcome of Readiness.   
2) Does the document set out a specific set of measures to be implemented in order 
to implement the condition? This criterion assesses an increased level of 
entrenchment as seeks to evaluate whether a process is stipulated to implement 
condition through Readiness. 
3) Does the document identify agents that are responsible and accountable for 
implementing the condition? The final criterion assesses if specific actors were 
designated to coordinate and implement the process of fulfilling the condition.  
On the country level, these three criteria determine how each condition for effectiveness 
is being addressed in the national country strategies. On an aggregate level, they reveal 
the outcomes that the WB and UN-REDD favour in the Readiness process by providing 
evidence on which kind of strategies these programs are supporting. 
The conditions for effectiveness as well as the criteria for evaluation were put together in 
a table comprising the conditions on the vertical axis and criteria on the horizontal axis. 
Table 4.1 presents the framework used in our study to analyse the R-PPs and NPDs. It 
contains the criteria and conditions, as well as the objective standards against which each 
criterion was evaluated. Because the country documents were long, complex and often 
confusing, having such an objective set of criteria was crucial in order to make policy 
evaluation commensurable. It should be noted that some of the standards are merely 
exemplificative. Because of the wide spectrum of proposed measures to reach certain 
outcomes, we could not predetermine which ones would be considered and which would 
not. Even so, our standards offered important guidelines for comparative evaluation. 
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If all the standards were met in the country documents, the criteria was evaluated with a 
“yes”; if none of the standards were satisfied, a “no” was attributed; if only some but not 
all standards were met (when more than one standard exists), the criterion was marked as 
“incomplete”.  
A final evaluation was ascribed to the treatment of each condition based on the grading of 
the three criteria. Three positive marks means the outcome was well addressed, and it 
was graded with a “ ” symbol; three negative marks means it was not addressed, and it 
was graded with a “ “; everything in between resulted in the evaluation of the outcome 
treatment as “insufficient”, and a “” was attributed.   
The aim of this exercise is to make countries comparable according to objective standards. 
In the end, each country had a “final evaluation column” (last row on the right in the table 
above), which can be used to compare which dimensions of Readiness are being 
prioritized by each country. When all the country evaluative tables are put together, it is 
possible to assess which underlying aspects of REDD are being emphasized in the 
Readiness processes.   
The table below illustrates the evaluative process by demonstrating what a country table 
might look like: 
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Table 4.2: Illustration of framework application 
Country “x” 
 
 
4.2 Limitations of analytical framework 
 
The analytical framework described above has several limitations, which stem both from 
the nature of the documents being analysed and from the theoretical assumptions of our 
model. 
As stated, the present study analyses solely the R-PPs and NPDs submitted to the FCPF 
and UN-REDD Programme in order to obtain funding. We are not assessing whether the 
                             Criteria 
Condition 
Condition 
addressed as an 
outcome of 
Readiness? 
Set of measures 
proposed for 
implementation? 
Actors responsible 
identified? 
Final 
Baseline emissions 
scenarios Y  Y  Y    
Transparent and 
reliable MRV systems N  N  N    
Secure land tenure and 
rights over carbon for 
LC 
I  I  I   
LC with ability to assess 
and engage in 
transactions 
Y  Y  I   
Development oriented 
BSM N  N  I   
Accountable and 
transparent mechanisms 
to channel REDD 
finance 
Y  Y  Y    
Law enforcement Y  Y  N   
Social impacts 
monitoring systems N  N  N    
Adequate definition of 
forests Y  N  N   
Environmental 
safeguards and 
monitoring systems
Y  I  Y   
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plans and measures comprised in such document will be implemented or how this will be 
done. In this sense, this is an evaluation of stated intentions and not of actions. 
Second, we have not tested whether the conditions for effectiveness used in our 
framework will, in practice, lead to more development-oriented REDD strategies. These 
conditions remain theoretical assumptions – the conditions are logically necessary for the 
realization of REDD’s stated local development goals – but, in practice, some might well 
be more important than others. The relative weight of these conditions on policy 
outcomes will probably be highly context-dependent and change according to other 
variables.  We have tried to select the most significant conditions for effectiveness 
through a thorough review of the literature on PES design and local development and on 
REDD, as well as through a rigorous analysis of the in-build governance logic behind 
REDD. Nevertheless, the significance of such conditions remains to be empirically 
proven. 
4.3 Selection of country case studies 
	
Currently, there are a total of thirty-seven countries taking part in the FCPF (Forest 
Carbon Partnership Facility, 2012) and fourteen countries participating in the UN-REDD 
program (UN-REDD, 2012). Amongst the FCPF partner countries, fifteen are located in 
Latin America, and four Latin American countries receive funding from the UN-REDD 
program. These countries, as well as their position in the Readiness processes, are listed 
in tables 4.3 and 4.4 below.  
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Table 4.3 – FPCF partner countries in Latin America 
 
Country/Status FCPF country? 
R-PIN 
Submitted? 
R-PP 
submitted? 
Final R-PP 
approved? 
RP Grant 
authorized? 
Argentina Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Colombia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Costa Rica Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mexico Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Guyana Yes Yes Yes Partially Yes 
Peru Yes Yes Yes Partially Yes 
Panama Yes Yes Draft Partially Yes 
Guatemala Yes Yes Yes Partially No 
Honduras Yes Yes Draft No No 
Nicaragua Yes Yes Draft No No 
Suriname Yes Yes Draft No No 
Bolivia Yes Yes No No No 
Chile Yes Yes No No No 
Paraguay Yes Yes No No No 
El Salvador Yes No No No No 
Ecuador No No No No No 
Total 15 14 7 4 7 
Source: Own compilation. Data from FCPF Website 
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Table 4.4 – UN-REDD Pilot Countries in Latin America 
 
Country/Status UN-REDD pilot country? NPD approved? 
Funding 
approved? 
Implementation 
begun? 
Bolivia Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panama Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ecuador Yes Yes Yes No 
Paraguay Yes Yes Yes No 
Argentina No x x x 
Colombia No x x x 
Costa Rica No x x x 
Mexico No x x x 
Guyana No x x x 
Peru No x x x 
Guatemala No x x x 
Honduras No x x x 
Nicaragua No x x x 
Suriname No x x x 
Chile No x x x 
El Salvador No x x x 
Total 4 4 4 1 
Source: Own compilation. Data from UN-REDD Websites 
 
Due to time constraints, we will not be able to evaluate all the fifteen Latin American 
countries taking part in Readiness. It was therefore necessary to choose a sample for the 
qualitative case studies. This sample should be representative in three ways: first, it 
should comprise countries taking part in both of the programmes, therefore enabling us to 
draw conclusions about the outcomes to be expected from the different initiatives. Second, 
it should include countries in different phases of the Readiness process. This will enable 
us to see if those countries that are further down the road – and have already had their 
RP-Grants authorized or approved – have better and more comprehensive strategies than 
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the ones that do not yet have access to funding.  Finally, it should contemplate countries 
from different sides of the economic and social development spectrum, measured by per 
capita GDP and HDI.  
The central idea of using these selection criteria is that we choose a sample with ample 
variance – different socio-economic profiles, different stages of Readiness and 
participation in different programs – to see if, despite these differences, there is a pattern 
in the output of Readiness processes. Based on these criteria, we selected the following 
six countries for our case studies: 
 
Table 4.5: Selected country sample and progress in Readiness processes  
Country FCPF country? 
R-PP 
submitted? 
Final R-PP 
approved? 
RP Grant 
authorized? 
UN-
REDD? 
NDP 
approved? 
Implement
ation? 
Mexico ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
Costa 
Rica ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
Guyana ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
Panama ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Bolivia ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Ecuador ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ 
Source: Own compilation. Data from FCPF and UN-REDD Websites 
 
 
The next chapter presents the results obtained by applying the analytical framework to 
the country governments designed by governments of these six countries. 
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Chapter 5 
Empirical analysis results of Readiness in Latin America: Building the 
conditions for a development-oriented REDD?  
As stated in section 4.1, applying the analytical framework to the selected country 
documents should render two levels of results. The first level consists of an assessment of 
national REDD strategies; the second is an aggregate evaluation of which policy elements 
are favoured in Readiness initiatives.   
In this section we will present these results, starting with a presentation of the individual 
country evaluation tables (section 5.1), followed by the presentation of aggregate results 
(section 52). Because of the large amount of data that was analysed, we will not dedicate 
a section to describing the individual country strategies. Rather, we will highlight their 
most notable aspects as we describe how the different conditions for effectiveness were 
addressed in the strategies. We are able to do this because several patterns were 
encountered in these documents, whereby REDD strategies systematically favour the 
design and implementation carbon accounting mechanisms over the implementation of 
conditions which are necessary for poverty alleviation and environmental sustainability.   
 
5.1 Country evaluation results 
	
This section presents the country evaluation tables, obtained by the application of the 
analytical framework described in section 4.2 to R-PPs and NPDs of selected countries. 
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Table 5.1: Mexico - final evaluation table  
                 
                               Criteria  
Outcome          
Condition 
addressed? 
Set of measures 
proposed for 
implementation? 
Responsible actors 
identified? 
Final evaluation 
for outcome 
Baseline emissions 
scenarios Y Y Y   
Transparent and reliable 
MRV systems Y Y Y   
Secure land tenure and 
rights over carbon for LC Y Y Y   
LC with ability to assess 
and engage in transactions I N N 	
Development oriented BSM Y I Y 	
Accountable and 
transparent mechanisms to 
channel REDD finance 
Y Y Y  	
Law enforcement Y Y N 	
Social impacts monitoring 
systems Y Y N 	
Adequate definition of 
forests Y Y N 	
Environmental safeguards 
and monitoring systems	 Y Y N 	
 
Source: Own compilation.  
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Table 5.2: Ecuador - final evaluation table  
 
 
                               Criteria  
Outcome          
Condition 
addressed? 
Set of measures 
proposed for 
implementation? 
Responsible actors 
identified? 
Final evaluation 
for outcome 
Baseline emissions 
scenarios Y Y Y   
Transparent and reliable 
MRV systems Y Y Y   
Secure land tenure and 
rights over carbon for LC I I I  
LC with ability to assess 
and engage in transactions I N N 	
Development oriented BSM Y Y Y  	
Accountable and 
transparent mechanisms to 
channel REDD finance 
I I Y 	
Law enforcement Y N N 	
Social impacts monitoring 
systems Y Y Y  	
Adequate definition of 
forests N N N  	
Environmental safeguards 
and monitoring systems	 Y Y Y  	
Source: Own compilation 
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Table 5.3: Guyana – final evaluation table 
 
                               Criteria  
Outcome          
Condition 
addressed? 
Set of measures 
proposed for 
implementation? 
Responsible actors 
identified? 
Final evaluation 
for outcome 
Baseline emissions 
scenarios 
 
Y Y Y   
Transparent and reliable 
MRV systems Y Y Y   
Secure land tenure and 
rights over carbon for LC Y I N  
LC with ability to assess 
and engage in transactions N N N  	
Development oriented BSM I N Y 	
Accountable and 
transparent mechanisms to 
channel REDD finance 
N N N  	
Law enforcement Y N N 	
Social impacts monitoring 
systems Y N N 	
Adequate definition of 
forests N N N  	
Environmental safeguards 
and monitoring systems	 I I N 	
Source: Own compilation. 
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Table 5.4: Panama – final evaluation table 
 
 
                              Criteria 
Outcome               
Condition 
addressed? 
Set of measures 
proposed for 
implementation? 
Responsible actors 
identified? 
Final evaluation 
for outcome 
Baseline emissions 
scenarios Y Y Y   
Transparent and reliable 
MRV systems Y Y Y   
Secure land tenure and 
rights over carbon for LC N N N   
LC with ability to assess 
and engage in transactions I N N 	
Development oriented BSM Y N N 	
Accountable and 
transparent mechanisms to 
channel REDD finance 
N N N  	
Law enforcement I I I 	
Social impacts monitoring 
systems N N N  	
Adequate definition of 
forests N N N  	
Environmental safeguards 
and monitoring systems	 N N N  	
Source: Own compilation. 
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Table 5.5: Costa Rica – final evaluation table 
 
                              Criteria 
Outcome               
Condition 
addressed? 
Set of measures 
proposed for 
implementation? 
Responsible actors 
identified? 
Final evaluation 
for outcome 
Baseline emissions 
scenarios Y Y Y   
Transparent and reliable 
MRV systems Y Y Y   
Secure land tenure and 
rights over carbon for LC Y Y Y   
LC with ability to assess 
and engage in transactions N N N  	
Development oriented BSM N N N  	
Accountable and 
transparent mechanisms to 
channel REDD finance 
Y N Y 	
Law enforcement I I I 	
Social impacts monitoring 
systems I I N 	
Adequate definition of 
forests N N N  	
Environmental safeguards 
and monitoring systems	 I I N 	
Source: Own compilation.  
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Table 5.6: Bolivia – final evaluation table 
 
                              Criteria 
Outcome               
Condition 
addressed? 
Set of measures 
proposed for 
implementation? 
Responsible actors 
identified? 
Final evaluation 
for outcome 
Baseline emissions 
scenarios Y Y Y   
Transparent and reliable 
MRV systems Y Y Y   
Secure land tenure and 
rights over carbon for LC Y I I  
LC with ability to assess 
and engage in transactions N N N  	
Development oriented BSM Y Y Y  	
Accountable and 
transparent mechanisms to 
channel REDD finance 
Y N N 	
Law enforcement N N N  	
Social impacts monitoring 
systems Y N N 	
Adequate definition of 
forests N N N  	
Environmental safeguards 
and monitoring systems	 I N N 	
Source: Own compilation. 
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5.2 Explication of aggregate results  
 
Table 5.7 compiles the six country document evaluations and compares country strategies 
according to how they address the ten conditions that are necessary for the 
implementation of a functional and development-oriented REDD. It is important to note 
that all country documents mentioned poverty alleviation and sustainable land use as 
expected outcomes of REDD implementation (for details, see section 5.2.2 and 5.2.3). 
Nevertheless, as can be seen in the table below, the implementation of a policy 
environment that in necessary for such outcomes was not well addressed in the 
documents presented to WB-FCPF and the UN-REDD Program.  
 
Table 5.7: Aggregate results table 
 
                                     Country 
Outcome               Mexico Costa Rica Ecuador Guyana Panama Bolivia 
Baseline emissions scenarios               
Transparent and reliable MRV 
systems               
Secure land tenure and rights over 
carbon for LC           
LC with ability to assess and 
engage in transactions   	      	
Development oriented BSM   	      	
Accountable and transparent 
mechanisms to channel REDD 
finance 
  	      	
Law enforcement  	     	
Social impacts monitoring 
systems  	      	
Adequate definition of forests   	        	
Environmental safeguards and 
monitoring systems	  	      	
Source: Own compilation. Data from FCPF website 
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A quick glance at the table is sufficient for a crucial conclusion to be drawn: R-PPs and 
NPDs systematically pay more attention to the development of baseline emissions 
scenarios and emissions monitoring, reporting and verification systems than they do to 
the establishment of the policy conditions that must be in place for REDD to serve as a 
local development mechanism.  
Even though there is variance in how R-PPs and NPDs address the necessary conditions 
for poverty alleviation and for the promotion of sustainable land use through forest 
carbon programs, all documents consistently present in-depth descriptions of how they 
intend to develop emissions inventories and monitoring systems and of which agencies 
are responsible for such outputs. They go into detail on the type of equipment that is to be 
purchased and used, describe the national and international delivery partners and sources 
of finance and specific methodologies to be used in carbon accounting. 
Other conditions for effectiveness – such as the development of social impacts 
monitoring systems, improving law enforcement and access to justice and providing local 
communities with the ability to understand and engage in carbon market transactions – 
were systematically sidelined in the country strategies and were only superficially 
addressed. Most R-PPs and NPDs only mention the importance of attaining these 
outcomes, but do not provide roadmaps for implementation or designate agencies 
responsible for coordinating implementation processes. Furthermore, there are hardly any 
specific budgets or adequate timeframes allocated to the achievement of such outcomes. 
In the following, we present how the ten conditions for effectiveness were addressed in 
the analysed documents. We will seek to present the policy design tendencies and 
patterns, and highlight specific country strategies when they constitute significant 
exceptions to the rule or when they serve to illustrate broader policy design tendencies. 
 
5.2.1 Conditions for effectiveness (I): carbon credit generation 
	
As emphasized above, the establishment of baseline scenarios and development of MRVs 
are core components of every R-PP and NDP. In most country documents, these 
outcomes – and namely the development of MRVs – were the most comprehensive and 
well-written sections of the REDD preparation strategy. Detailed accounts were provided 
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on implementation processes and roadmaps, the agencies and actors involved in 
execution and coordination, methodologies and measurement equipment (Government of 
Panama, 2009, p. 60-73; Government of Mexico, 2011, p. 52-65; Government of Guyana, 
2010, p. 57-86; Government of Costa Rica, 2010, p. 68-91; Government of Ecuador, 
2011, §208-227; Government of Bolivia, 2010, p. 22-25).  
The sections on baselines and MRV comprised in R-PPs were highly technical and many 
times difficult to understand, a fact that reduces the capacity of civil society to monitor 
these investments and therefore lowers the accountability of actors involved in the policy 
processes. Only the Ecuadorian NPD proposes to actively involve local communities in 
the carbon stock measurement and monitoring process (Government of Ecuador, 2011, 
§213), while Mexico proposes to let the UNFCCC scrutinize its methodologies and 
carbon accounting results (Government of Mexico, 2011). 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that investments in MRVS and carbon accounting take up 
a large part of the Readiness budgets in many country documents (table 5.8), and, 
especially in the case of FCPF countries, specific timeframes were establishment for the 
development of accounting systems. 
 
Table 5.8 - Structure of FCPF R-PP Budget Requirements by Component and Country9 
Values in USD $1000 
                  Country 
Component 
Mexico Panama Guyana Costa 
Rica 
Bolivia total % total 
Organize and 
consult 
$536 $3,000 $1,063 $1,219 $495 $6,313 9,1% 
Develop REDD 
strategy 
$7,644 $500 $1,355 $2,240 $2,855 $14,594 21% 
Develop reference 
level 
$1,175 $300 $480 $642 $300 $2,897 4,2% 
MRV $30,234 $10,200 $2,850 $248 $750 $44,282 64% 
Program 
management 
- $1,000 $85 - - $1,085 1,7% 
Total $39,053 $12,000 $4,770 $3,130 $3,905 $69,171 100% 
Source: Adapted from Ardot, 2010 
																																																								
9	Ecuador	NDP	does	not	specify	the	budget	to	be	allocated	to	each	component.	
49
5.2.2 Conditions for effectiveness (II): Poverty alleviation through REDD 
	
The treatment given to the institutional reforms necessary for alleviating poverty through 
REDD was generally unsatisfactory. Most documents overtly state that poverty 
alleviation is a central objective of REDD (for examples, see: Government of Mexico 
2011, p. 9; Government of Guyana 2010, p. 38 Government of Panama 2009, p. 36) but 
with the exception of Ecuador and Bolivia, they all fail to present any specific data on 
poverty and do not establish channels through which poverty-stricken communities will 
benefit from a REDD scheme. After reading all the R-PPs, we are left without knowing 
the reach and depth of poverty in rural and forested areas, and no clue is provided as to 
what poverty alleviation might entail in the context of Readiness. It is important to note 
that the UN-REDD Readiness documents are more comprehensive and attentive than the 
R-PPs in the mapping out of poverty in the country and specifying which populations 
should benefit from REDD (Government of Ecuador, 2011; Government of Bolivia, 
2010). 
Two of the conditions that must be in place in order for poverty-stricken and 
marginalized rural population to benefit from REDD finance – rights to carbon and the 
capacity to understand and engage in carbon transactions – were barely addressed in 
country documents. With the exception of Mexico (Government of Mexico, 2011, p. 35) 
and Costa Rica (Government of Costa Rica, 2010, p. 60), no other document mentions 
the need to clarify ownership and rights over carbon as a component of Readiness. 
Panama, on the other hand, explicitly stated that carbon rights belong to the central 
government (Government of Panama, 2009, p. 42), a claim that is likely to keep financial 
benefits out of the hands of local landowners and indigenous communities.  
Whilst many country documents specify the need to invest in capacity-building activities, 
these are mostly described as awareness-raising and consensus-building processes, and 
not as initiatives that will construct the capacity of local communities to understand the 
legal system and critically assess carbon contracts that might be proposed to them. If such 
communities are not provided with the capacity to assess the costs and benefits of 
engaging in carbon transactions, i.e., to act as “rational agents” in the market, chances are 
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they will not benefit from the sale of their carbon. Many cases of exploitation already 
exist in the forest carbon market.10 
The need to improve law enforcement is also only superficially mentioned in country 
strategies. In documents that do mention the need to improve law enforcement, this is 
done through the discourse of surveillance and punishment and not of improving access 
to the judicial system and other instances of conflict resolution. No mention is made to 
improving the capacity and accessibility of the judicial branch or other conflict resolution 
mechanisms. Mexico is again an exception, being the only R-PP to propose a channel 
through which local communities can voice their complaints and grievances to the local 
administration and the judiciary at their own will. Panama, on the other hand, is willing to 
sacrifice procedural rights in the name of enhanced law enforcement and forest 
conservation, and adopts a seemingly dangerous punitive approach to forest governance: 
“Decentralization of environmental management in connection with environmental MCI 
activities and coordination and strengthening of the bodies responsible for public order, 
such as the provincial, district and comarca governments, are essential for protecting the 
environment. Such bodies have policing powers and the authority to correct breaches of 
law and order without having to go through the lengthy and complex proceedings typical 
of, say, the administrative and judicial spheres. Article 32 of the Constitution grants them 
the necessary powers and, even though they are bound by Administrative Law, decisions 
taken at this level are more expeditious than those handed down in other proceedings” 
(Government of Panama, 2009, p. 46). 
Governments proved to be far less eager to monitor and enforce their own actions than 
they are of punishing irregular land use. The establishment of transparent and 
accountable mechanisms to channel REDD finance is one of the most poorly addressed 
components of the R-PPs and NPDs.  The issue is not even mentioned in the Guyana and 
Panama documents, and is treated only superficially by Bolivia, Ecuador and Costa Rica. 
Again, Mexico is the only country to address the problem in depth, establishing processes 
																																																								
10	Many	 recent	 cases	 illustrate	 the	 exploitation	of	 local	 communities	 in	 carbon	 transactions	 due	 to	
their	incapacity	to	fully	comprehend	the	complex	and	terms	of	international	transactions.	Indigenous	
communities	 have	 been	 voicing	 complaints	 that	 such	 contracts	 have	 been	 to	 their	 disadvantage	
because	 they	 were	 not	 fully	 informed	 of	 the	 terms	 and	 conditions	 of	 the	 transaction.	 For	 recent	
examples,	 see	 articles	 on	 REDD‐Monitor	 http://www.redd‐monitor.org/2012/03/13/celestial‐
green‐ventures‐20‐million‐hectares‐of‐redd‐carbon‐offset‐projects‐in‐brazil/	(last	access	on	April	8th	
2012);	 http://www.redd‐monitor.org/2012/02/22/redd‐under‐the‐spotlight‐–‐can‐‘reducing‐
deforestation‐and‐forest‐degradation’‐deliver‐real‐benefits‐for‐the‐climate‐and‐for‐rural‐
communities/	(last	access	on	April	8th	2012).	
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and designating institutions to receive and channel REDD finance. According to the 
Mexican R-PP, a National REDD Fund will be created, managed through a participatory 
mechanism involving all relevant stakeholders and supervised by the Federal Auditing 
Agency, an independent body with the capacity to monitor, disclose and enforce finance 
flows (Government of Mexico, 2011, p. 36-37).   
The treatment given to developing benefit sharing mechanisms was also unsatisfactory, 
but for different reasons. All country documents with the exception of Costa Rica 
presented the establishment of a development-oriented BSM as one of the outcomes of 
Readiness. But all FCPF countries failed to provide a normative definition of how such a 
mechanisms should look like, who should benefit and which stakeholders would be 
involved in the resource distribution process. Bolivia and Ecuador, on the other hand, 
specify that the distribution of REDD finance should benefit above all local service 
providers, who participate in REDD schemes as stewards of forests. According to the 
Ecuadorian NPD:  
“The MAE‘s preliminary definitions of this issue establish that most of the benefits should 
target forest owners or direct beneficiaries implementing the activities to reduce 
deforestation and associated emissions at the local level. The mechanism for benefit 
distribution should consider planning tools at the local level such as community life plans, 
local development plans and local land-use plans (Government of Panama, 2009, §179). 
Here, again, the country documents submitted to the UN-REDD Programme are more 
coherent and normative in their approach to regulating REDD in a pro-development 
manner.  
 
5.2.3 Conditions for effectiveness (III): Sustainable land use 
	
All country strategies define sustainable land use and environmental quality enhancement 
as desired outputs of REDD, but, again, the outcome is treated in a superficial and limited 
manner. Only the Bolivian and Ecuadorian NPDs proceed with an in-depth analysis of 
the environmental risks posed by REDD, while other documents mention such risks only 
superficially or not at all, preferring to highlight the positive local environmental impacts 
that might result from REDD. 
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With the exception of the Mexican R-PP, which establishes that an appropriate definition 
of forests will be developed through participatory mechanisms (Government of Mexico, 
2011), no document even mentions the need to develop a clear and environmentally 
suitable definition of forests and of which carbon storage activities will be considered 
under REDD.  
Environmental safeguards and monitoring systems were also poorly integrated into the 
Readiness preparation strategies. Only the Ecuadorian NPD addressed the condition 
thoroughly, stating that the Readiness process will necessarily involve the establishment 
of environmental and social baseline scenarios and the development of indicators and 
systems to monitor changes in environmental quality and local livelihood. The Ministry 
of Environment is designated responsible for coordinating this process along with 
different civil society participants (Government of Ecuador, 2011, S. § 202). However, 
the approach is not perfect and is not nearly comprehensive – the document does not 
specify processes or indicators, nor which participants will take part in decision making 
processes.  Other country documents mention that environmental impacts must be 
measured, but do not propose systems to continuously monitor environmental quality.   
 
5.3 Further observations 
	
It is also important to highlight other patterns in the policy design adopted by country 
documents revealed through analysis. First, all countries with the exception of Bolivia are 
explicitly preparing themselves to integrate a future forest carbon offsetting scheme. 
REDD is therefore designed as a strategy to receive market finance by selling Certified 
Emissions Reductions to the global carbon market (Government of Ecuador, 2011, p. 
§83; Government of Guyana, 2010, p. 44; Government of Panama, 2009, p. 42). This is 
done without any analysis of the risks entailed by trading forest carbon offsets and with 
little consideration being given to other possible sources of REDD finance.  
Moreover, very little attention was given to the policy environment in which REDD is to 
be implemented, namely to the problems and limitations faced by government institutions 
and bureaucracies. R-PPs eagerly propose new administrative bodies to coordinate and 
execute REDD strategies, but do not address the underlying problems of public 
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administration that must be tackled if REDD is to function properly, such as corruption, 
lack of specialized staff, vested interests, underfinancing, etc. 
In fact, the risks REDD entails are addressed only in the Ecuadorian and Bolivian country 
documents, and not even mentioned in the R-PPs. Without serious consideration and 
analysis of such risks, and without the development of mechanisms to reduce them, 
REDD is unlikely to foster any type of local sustainable development. 
  
 5.4 – Discussion 
	
The analysis presented above demonstrates that the Readiness initiatives in Latin 
America are, in fact, biased in favour of developing carbon accounting and MRV systems 
to the detriment of realizing deeper institutional reforms and improvements in forest 
governance. This suggests the emergence of a poorly regulated market for forest carbon, 
which is more likely to reproduce existing patterns of injustice and underdevelopment 
than to promote livelihood and environmental improvements. Even though we analysed 
countries with different socio-economic conditions and in different stages of Readiness, 
all cases followed the same pattern. 
On the other hand, it must be noted that Bolivia and Ecuador – the two countries 
participating in the UN-REDD Programme – systematically fared better in their treatment 
of the underlying policy conditions for poverty alleviation. These country documents 
were more focused on the social and distributional potential of REDD; they also mapped 
out and assessed rural poverty and clearly defended the coining of REDD strategies that 
would benefit above all the poverty-stricken rural communities who operate as local 
service providers under the proposed global PES scheme. 11  Our analysis therefore 
indicates that UN-REDD is more likely to result in development-oriented REDD 
strategies than the FCPF. 
The different operational and normative frameworks of the Readiness initiatives may 
account for the variance among NPDs and R-PPs. On the one hand, the FCPF has been 
hesitant to adopt strong social and environmental safeguard policies. A clear system of 
																																																								
11 It should be noted that the government of Bolivia has recently positioned itself firmly against the use of 
carbon markets for REDD finance. For a discussion, see  Benton-Connell (2011). 
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safeguards has progressively been substituted by a dense set of guidelines that appear to 
water down existing policies and obfuscate minimum standards (Dooley, Griffiths, 
Martone, & Ozinga, 2011). Confirming this tendency, in the end of 2010 the FCPF 
confirmed that it would use Strategic Environmental and Social Assessments (SESA) as a 
tool for managing the environmental and social risks of readiness activities. This meant 
that individual countries would determine, throughout the Readiness process, which 
safeguards are to be applied and monitored, depending on specific risks entailed by 
readiness activities. This results in the fragmentation of safeguarding, as there are no 
more robust and binding standards that apply to all participants.  
The FCPF Guidelines for Formulating an R-PP require that specific sections be dedicated 
to the establishment of a baseline and the development of an MRV system, and the WB is 
very clear on what it expects in these sections (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, 2010). 
Meanwhile, national governments are free to organize how, where and to what extent 
they address the issues of governance, institutional improvement and local development 
through REDD. This results in unclear documents, where intended outcomes and policy 
reforms are presented in a scattered and fragmented manner.  
On the other hand, the UN-REDD Programme has been clearer about the application of 
environmental and social safeguard policies to the Readiness process (UN-REDD, 2011), 
and the programme’s operational guidelines explicitly contemplate outcomes such as the 
realization of the multiple benefits of forests; the development of national systems for 
transparent, equitable, credible and accountable management of REDD funding; the 
establishment of inclusive governance systems; and the Right to Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent of Indigenous populations (UN-REDD, 2011). 
The disappointing treatment given by country documents to underlying policy reforms 
and governance improvements might be explained by the very structure of Readiness and 
its phased approach. The three-stage logic of REDD rushes countries along reform 
processes that would demand a substantial amount of time and investments to succeed. 
Under Readiness, developing countries are to prepare themselves to integrate a system of 
positive incentives in roughly three years, and this pushes governments to underscore 
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processes and measures that can be implemented in that timeframe whilst satisfying 
donors – namely, carbon accounting mechanisms.  
The poor quality of R-PPs and NPDs might also be attributed to the fact that the FCPF 
and UN-REDD interact primarily with national governments and not with independent 
civil society organizations, academia or other stakeholders. Despite the fact that the 
management boards include participants from several sectors, national governments are 
ultimately responsible for planning, designing and implementing Readiness, and they are 
very reluctant to admit the limitations and problems of public administration, especially if 
this might prevent the disbursement of REDD funding. Therefore, country documents are 
likely to systematically cover up endemic problems such as corruption, understaffing, 
inefficient bureaucracies and elite capture. 
Finally, since REDD is intended to reward countries solely for reduction in GHG 
emissions and not other outcomes such as local livelihood improvements and betterment 
of environmental quality, there are no incentives for national governments to take these 
outcomes seriously in devising national REDD strategies. Under REDD’s current 
normative and operational framework, local development remains a marginal and 
incremental outcome of a global strategy to mitigate forest carbon. It is an accidental co-
benefit that has few chances of being realized. To change this outlook, both REDD and 
Readiness must be deeply reformed to accommodate and reward local development, a 
topic we will briefly develop in our conclusion. 
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Conclusion 
Through the analysis of six REDD strategies, the present study has demonstrated that 
Readiness initiatives in Latin America systematically privilege investments in the 
development of emissions baseline scenarios and MRV systems over investments in 
governance and institutional improvements, even through such reforms constitute 
conditions for REDD’s effective operation as a development mechanism. Despite the 
immense differences amongst analysed countries, the policies being designed under 
Readiness are similar in their instruments, goals and structures, suggesting such 
initiatives are influencing and homogenising forest sector policy reforms in developing 
countries.   
While the R-PPs and NPDs dedicated large sections to the planning and budgeting of 
MRV systems, little attention was given to the development of social and environmental 
impacts monitoring systems, nor to the improvement of government bureaucracies 
involved in REDD implementation. Measures concerning legal specification and 
allocation of carbon rights were barely mentioned, and plans to prepare local 
communities to understand and participate in carbon transactions were absent from 
country documents. Our data indicates that Readiness is not oriented towards building a 
development-oriented strategy, but rather towards the enablement of a poorly regulated 
forest carbon market that is more likely to reproduce injustices and patterns of 
underdevelopment than to remediate them.  
The governance rationale of REDD suggests that a number of variables might be 
influencing the bias of Readiness strategies and determining their failure to address 
underlying governance issues. First and foremost, REDD’s performance-based incentives 
structure only credits quantifiable GHG emissions reductions, providing few incentives 
for governments to pursue social and environmental improvements through REDD. 
Furthermore, the adoption of a phased approach to REDD pushes governments to rush 
through the policy and institutional reform stages in order to reach the “positive 
incentives” phase as quickly as possible. The operational framework of the FCPF may 
also result in countries being more attentive when designing MRV systems than when 
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planning broad governance improvements. This might explain why UN-REDD countries 
fare better in addressing the underlying socio-economic context in forest areas and 
proposing more far-reaching improvements in forest governance. Finally, the reliance on 
carbon market finance may also result in overinvestments in MRV systems to the 
detriment of deeper and more complex institutional reforms.  
What we therefore reveal is that the problems encountered in building REDD as a 
development-oriented mechanism are deeply entrenched in the governance logic of this 
instrument. REDD does not have local development at its normative and operational core, 
and our analysis suggests that it is unlikely to generate local improvements as “happy 
accidents”, namely because the policy environment that must be in place for such 
outcomes to be achieved is complex and requires substantial planning. Different elements 
of REDD policy design must be reformed if it is to work as a strategy that simultaneously 
delivers benefits on the global and local levels. To conclude, we suggest a series of deep 
policy reforms that should be considered toward this end. 
If REDD is to foster local development whilst maintaining its performance-based policy 
deign, social and environmental outcomes must be incorporated into the REDD 
compensation system. Like emissions reductions, variations in social and environmental 
indicators (such as income, social infrastructure, biodiversity, water quality, etc.) should 
measured against a pre-REDD baseline, reported and credited. This would provide the 
necessary incentives for governments to take these outcomes seriously, but at the same 
time is likely to make the strategy more expensive and, therefore, turn REDD into a less 
cost-effective carbon mitigation strategy. Furthermore, such a policy design could not tap 
into compliance carbon markets, and would have to rely on different funding sources, 
such as development aid or voluntary carbon markets.   
Still concerning the broad policy design of REDD, our study suggests that the phased 
approach logic is serving to artificially speed up the Readiness process and bypass 
necessary investments in forest governance. One way to solve this problem is be to make 
REDD an input-based system similar to previous ODA efforts but with a stronger focus 
on conditionalities and institutional reforms in land tenure and forest governance. This 
would give governments time and resources to implement reforms and improve 
governance, thereby reducing deforestation. It would also foster a governance and rights-
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based approach to reducing deforestation instead of a performance-based one, a strategy 
that is more likely to benefit local communities. 
Moreover, the FCPF and UN-REDD should reconsider their guidelines and operational 
structures. To generate better country strategies, these organizations will have to improve 
their mechanisms to involve civil society and other sectors from outside government. The 
FCPF must also work to clarify the confusion that now underlies the application of 
environmental and social safeguards.   
Finally, reliance on the international carbon market for REDD finance should be 
reconsidered. Negotiations about the inclusion of forestry a post-2012 climate regime 
remain inconclusive, and reliance on carbon offset financing enhances the need to invest 
in carbon MRV systems and carbon accounting in order to transform forest carbon into a 
tradable commodity. Such investments do not generate income or livelihood 
improvements for local communities, and they do not improve local environmental 
quality in any way.   
These are not simple policy reforms and will run into the resistance of important 
stakeholders. In the end, it will be necessary to decide between a REDD strategy that is 
focused on the generation of cost-effective carbon offset credits or the implementation of 
a broader policy tool capable of fostering global and local benefits.  
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